lack of spontaneity in artworks, i.e., the loss of flexibility espoused by Dickie's definition, is established by Lord via two routes: a) arguing that being a work of art is incompatible with institutionality (Incompatibility Argument), and b) arguing that the creation, presentation, and appreciation of a work of art is not governed by conventions (Nonconventionality Argument.) (In order to remain consistent with Lord's emphasis, analysis (a) will mainly discuss the freedom, originality and conventions involved in the creation of a work of art; other conventions of presentation and appreciation will play a more important role later in argument (b) .)
The following reformulates Lord's Incompatibility Argument (a):
(1) If a work of art is defined as institutional, then the practice of making works of art is essentially conservative.
(2) If the institution is conservative, then the institutional definition precludes creativity.
.'. (3) If a work of art is defined as institutional, then the institutional definition precludes creativity.
(4) The making of a work of art involves freedom, creativity, originality and spontaneity.
.'. (5) A work of art is not to be defined as institutional.
Dickie defines "institution" as an established, continuing, traditional practice, perhaps complete with a unique history, e.g., the institution of theater. (ii) Everyone believes that the others conform to R.
(iii) This belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a good and decisive reason to conform to R himself.
(iv) There is a general preference for general conformity to R rather than slightlyless-than-general conformity-in particular, rather than conformity by all but any one.
(v) R is not the only possible regularity meeting the last two conditions . . .
There is at least one alternative R' . . . Then conditions of (i) through (vi) of (C) hold.
(7) But for R* and P*, (iv), (v), and (vi) of (C) do not hold.
. (8) Secondary conventions, however, are the many nonessential yet traditional ways of creation, presentation, and appreciation; these can vary greatly, e.g., the Chinese prop man who is not hidden by a curtain, the hidden prop man in most traditional theater, the arrangement of seats and stage, the distribution of programs, and the curtain's rising and falling.
Lord misinterprets this dichotomy by broadening the range of the primary convention to include two aspects: understanding plus the practices of program distribution, seating, the curtain's rising, and the like. In other words, she defines primary convention in terms of Dickie's primary plus secondary conventions. Then she defines secondary conventions by restricting them to "the hiding of the non-aesthetic aspects of the performance such as the wiring and the stage hands."8 Herein lies the confusion of stipulating conventions R* in (6): the respective conventions are not correctly individuated and Lord allows secondary conventions to govern only the nonaesthetic features of a work of art.
The consequences of this confusion, however, can be avoided by considering each type of convention in (6) in turn. First, let R1* = the primary convention of the artworld. Lord's criticism of Dickie's notion of a primary convention would merit considerable consideration if indeed her main contention in (8) of the Nonconventionality Argument was that this so-called convention is simply a regularity, due to (7).
Premise (7) states that conditions (iv) through (vi) of Lewis' (C) are violated, i.e., the conditions stipulating general preference for conformity (iv), an alternative R' (v), and mutual knowledge (vi). But Lord does not stipulate R1* so precisely. And even if she had, Dickie now concedes (in a forthcoming work) that what he previously called a primary convention is not a convention at all, in Lewis's sense, but can be best characterized in another way.9 The major reason, incidentally, seemed to be the difficulty in posing an alternative to the primary convention, Lewis' condition (v).
Second, let R2* the secondary conventions of the art-world. Again, premise (7) is true just in case Lord has shown these conventions to violate conditions (iv) through In other words, in violation of (iv), it is the creative artist who is the one exception (or at least one) who disrupts general preference for general conformity by introducing an alternative, in violation of (v), which is not prior common knowledge, in violation of (vi).
Concerning condition (iv), Lewis anticipates the problem of tolerable exceptions to the given conditions of definition (C) by stipulating degrees of conventionality. (All three versions, viz., the final, quantitative, and (C) bear this out.) Actual conventions aspire to the ideal of general preference for general conformity to a greater or lesser degree. Granting this view, Lord's creative artist does not constitute a counterinstance to general preference for general conformity. Nor do a few "mavericks," as she calls them. Condition (iv) is intended to explain the self-perpetuation of a convention; it does not presume to guide human behavior by means of rules or sanctions. Thus the creative artist is not an exception to the regularity by introducing a possible alternative regularity, for in terms of secondary conventions, each is as acceptable as the other. And if, in fact, the few mavericks become more and more welcome in the artworld, this signals only a change in the general preference of a particular convention, not an end to secondary conventions altogether.
Regarding (v), which is intended to insure the arbitrary nature of conventions, one can object that the artist need not be the sole member of the population to envision an alternative. Perhaps the artist's position is unique in the artworld (Dickie never really does promote an egalitarian view) but this does not preclude other members, e.g., critics or historians, from envisioning alternatives although they do not actually introduce them.
Lastly, condition (vi) is not violated if we consider Lewis's notion of potential knowledge with regard to conditions (i) through (v) of (C).12 The population may not have bothered to think seriously about other members' preferences and reasons for conforming to the regularity or possible alternative regularity, but it seems certain that they could provide accounts (or at least possess the knowledge) of artworld regularities and alternatives, etc., prior to the introduction of an alternative. An art historical context is not inconsistent with mutual knowledge, and most members of the artworld population do know of alternative conventions to a given regularity before they are introduced, e.g., dispensing with theater programs or hanging paintings upside down.
For the above reasons, (7) which asserts that conditions (iv) through (vi) of Lewis's (C) are violated, is false. Thus Lord's conclusion (8) is not justified with respect to R,,*; Lord has not shown art to be devoid of secondary conventions. The total picture then, is that Lord's conclusion (8) of the Nonconventionality Argument (b) is not justified with respect to either primary or secondary conventions.
Combining (8) of the Nonconventionality Argument with (5) of the Incompatibility Argument, i.e., a work of art is not to be defined as institutional, yields the conjunction: a work of art is not to be defined this conjunction was intended to show the antecedent of (L) to be false. But neither of Lord's conclusions, (5) In order to point out counterexamples to (L1), the conditional restricted to conventionality, which are of Type II, let us consider (L1) in light of the following claim, which preserves Lewis's definition of convention as outlined in (C):
(N) (Secondary) conventions are necessary for the originality, freedom and spontaneity associated with works of art.
Evidence for (N) can be found in many places. Current writings in art criticism frequently refer to conventions. E. H. Gombrich explains the history of illusion in pictorial representation as partially dependent upon conventions: the artist is constantly presented with a choice between alternative methods of technique and style, based upon knowledge of past and present traditions. Art history categorizes artworks in terms of common characteristics, e.g., Neo-Classical works blatantly revert to former conventions.
The creation of all art-the main concern here is creation and not presentation or appreciation, although conventions govern these aspects as well-is governed by conventions which can be artistic but not necessarily so.13 Such conventions can also be functional, religious, magical, decorative, etc. The artist's knowledge of art history can be extensive or null; the originality in the work created is an outgrowth of his knowledge of certain conventions, artistic or otherwise. Granted, a cataloging of such conventions would help to clarify (N), as would an accounting of the role of conventions in the creative process, how they originate, change, and die out, but such a project cannot be accomplished here.
Perhaps one example will provide some focus. Critics claim that the last decade of
